

APPEAL NO. 041826  
FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on June 28, 2004. The hearing officer determined that the appellant's (claimant) \_\_\_\_\_, compensable injury does not include an injury to the cervical spine, right shoulder or right knee. The claimant appeals this determination and asserts that the hearing officer erred in excluding page 16 of Claimant's Exhibit No. 10. The respondent (self-insured) responds, urging affirmance of the hearing officer's decision.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The hearing officer did not err in excluding page 16 of Claimant's Exhibit No. 10 on the basis that it had not been timely exchanged with the self-insured. In order to obtain reversal of a judgment based upon the hearing officer's abuse of discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence, an appellant must first show that the admission or exclusion was in fact an abuse of discretion, and also that the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92241, decided July 24, 1992; see *also Hernandez v. Hernandez*, 611 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). It has also been held that reversible error is not ordinarily shown in connection with rulings on questions of evidence unless the whole case turns on the particular evidence admitted or excluded. *Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman*, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We find no abuse of discretion in the hearing officer's application of the exchange of evidence rules.

Extent of injury was a factual question for the hearing officer to resolve. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. *Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey*, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). It was the hearing officer's prerogative to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, including that of the claimant. *Aetna Insurance Company v. English*, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the hearing officer's decision is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. *Cain v. Bain*, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **(a self-insured governmental entity)** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CITY SECRETARY  
(ADDRESS)  
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).**

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Chris Cowan  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Judy L. S. Barnes  
Appeals Judge

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Robert W. Potts  
Appeals Judge